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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
We  use an evolutionary  model  to simulate  agents  who  choose  between  two  options  with
stochastically  varying  payoffs.  Two types  of  agents  are considered:  individual  learners,  who
rely on  trial-and-error  methods,  and  social  learners,  who  imitate  the wealthiest  sampled
individual.  Agents  adapt to  changing  environments  within  one  generation  by  using  their
respective  learning  strategy.  The  frequency  of  the  agent  types  adapts  between  generations
according  to the agents’  acquired  wealth.  During  the  course  of  evolution,  social  learning
becomes  dominant,  resulting  in three  major  effects:  First,  for better  or  worse,  the  decisions
of social  learners  are  more  exaggerated  than  those  of individual  learners.  Second,  social
learners  react  with  a delay  to  changes  in  the  environment.  Third,  the  behavior  of social
learners  becomes  more  and  more  detached  from  reality.  We  argue  that  our model  gives
insights  into  economic  systems  and markets.
©  2015  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V.  This  is an  open  access  article  under  the  CC
BY-NC-ND  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
A large part of what separates us from most other animals is arguably the ability to learn from one another, and not just
from nature. Precious little of our knowledge is strictly gained from personal experience, and much is learned from someone
else (who, in turn, probably also had learned it from others) – either by direct instruction or by imitation. Focusing on the
latter, we can see that there are ﬁelds in which our behavior is governed purely by imitation: Very few people invent their
own articles of clothing and food without ever having seen anyone else wear or consume them before, and a whole range of
‘appropriate’ behaviors that govern our daily routine was  picked up through observation and imitation.
Such imitative learning is also part of economic behavior. One in three institutional investors, who often receive consid-
erable remuneration for their knowledge and independent judgment, say that their stockbroker was  “inﬂuential” in their
decision to buy a stock. Only one in four said that they had “conducted their own analysis” (Shiller and Pound, 1989).1
Imitation inﬂuences the competitiveness in Cournot markets (Huck et al., 1999; Apesteguia et al., 2007).
When humans learn from others, they imitate the successful. Even three- and four-year olds preferentially learn from
successful models (Birch et al., 2008). Investors place a disproportionate amount of money in funds whose returns in the
past 12 months were exceptional – even though these funds tend to do much worse than average in the following period
 We  are grateful to Robert Boyd, Peter Norman Sørensen, Nicolaas Vriend (the editor) and two  anonymous referees for helpful comments. B.B. and P.H.
thank  the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (SFB 618) for funding.
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +49 30 20938649.
E-mail addresses: b.bossan@gmail.com (B. Bossan), ole.jann@econ.ku.dk (O. Jann), p.hammerstein@biologie.hu-berlin.de (P. Hammerstein).
1 Since the survey was  conducted by questionnaire, social learning is likely under- and individual research over-reported.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2015.01.010
0167-2681/© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).



































nig. 1. (A) Exemplary simulation run with a population consisting of 50% social and 50% individual learners. (B) Exemplary evolutionary run showing the
requency of social learners.
Economist, 2011). And the history of bubbles, from tulipomania to subprime, is the story of outsiders becoming market
articipants because they watch others make huge proﬁts (Shiller, 2003; Tett, 2009).
But given the tendency of people to adopt successful behaviors or strategies, these cultural traits should become more
requent over time. New variations of learning strategies may  enter the market through creative processes or mistakes,
hereas scarcity of capital creates competition that will weed out unsuccessful learning strategies. These three ingredients
 variation, competition, and preferential replication of successful strategies – are sufﬁcient to give rise to an evolutionary
rocess. E.g. the investment strategy invented by a successful portfolio manager survives and is copied by others, while
nsuccessful strategies disappear – either because their agents now have less capital at their disposal, leave the market, or
hoose to imitate the successful agents. Although this process is not natural (Darwin, 1859) but cultural, it will still have
imilar features (cf. Weibull, 1995; Gintis, 2000; Hammerstein and Hagen, 2005; Mesoudi et al., 2006). This leads to the
volutionary theory of economic behavior which Alchian (1950) has described in his seminal article in 1950.2
The model we have in mind is that of a society in which thousands of individuals engage in different learning strategies, and
he frequency of different strategies is itself dependent on how successful these strategies have been in the past. This model,
ith stochastic underlying values, independent choices of all individuals, and the interconnectedness through learning from
thers, is too complex to lend itself to analytical solution methods. That is why  we engage in agent-based simulations. We
horoughly check these simulations for robustness to changes in the set-up and parameter values.
Our work is based on the assumption that imitation of success gives rise to the forces of evolution. Instead of introducing
 presumably rational or irrational strategy and study the resulting phenomena, we  observe which learning strategy prevails
nd how abundant it becomes in equilibrium. Then we analyze how the behavior of a population in equilibrium relates to the
nvironment. Our model is discussed in Section 2, a detailed elaboration of our ﬁndings is given in Section 3, the connection
f these ﬁndings with real world phenomena and comparisons with existing models is part of Section 4.
Using the evolutionary framework, we assume that agents with distinct learning strategies adopt different behaviors,
nteract with other agents in the population, and reproduce according to the ﬁtness (or “wealth”) they aggregate during their
ifetime. A quick presentation of the model can be found in Fig. 1. The environment is characterized by two options, A and B,
hose payoffs cannot be directly observed and ﬂuctuate over time. Consequently, none of the options will always be better
han the other. Within each generation, individuals adapt by repeatedly choosing one of the options according to a ﬁxed
earning strategy. Between generations, those individuals with the most success replicate at a higher rate, which leads to an
djustment of the frequency of the learning strategies. Therefore, our model has a nested structure: What an individual learns
aries within each generation and is adapted to the environment; how the individuals learn varies between generations and
s adapted to the composition of the population. The model thus differs from other models in that the behavior of the
ndividuals ﬂexibly adjusts according to the learning strategy (panel A), whereas the learning strategies adjust over a larger
ime scale (panel B). A detailed model description can be found in Section 2.
Imitative behavior has been studied previously in the context of informational cascades (Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani
t al., 1992; Anderson and Holt, 1997; Ziegelmeyer et al., 2010). Informational cascades may  arise if choices are made
equentially and previous choices by others can be observed. In most of the models, one individual after the other has to decide
etween two options. The decision can be based on a private signal that is noisy and on observation of the choice of previous
ndividuals. After a certain amount of individuals have chosen one option over the other, the reliability of the information
2 Alchian himself has described his approach as “reverting to a Marshallian type of analysis combined with the essentials of Darwinian evolutionary
atural selection” (Alchian, 1950, fn 7 on p. 113).
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derived from observing previous choices will exceed the reliability of the private signal. It is then individually rational for all
subsequent individuals to disregard their personal information and follow the others, triggering an informational cascade.
The model we propose is not just another theory of herding or informational cascades. There are several choices to be
made over time, and in-between observing the behavior of others and choosing yourself, the environment may  have changed,
rendering the previous observations obsolete. Thus, in our model, it is not trivially true that one should blindly follow the
majority despite its choice conﬂicting with personal judgment. Whether the beneﬁts acquired by imitation outweigh the
costs depends on the composition of the population. We  ﬁnd that the more imitators there are, the less it pays to imitate. In
this way, we mirror earlier ﬁndings (Rogers, 1988).
Informational cascades can lead to bad aggregate behavior if the ﬁrst few individuals accidentally chose the worse option.
Still it is more likely than not that a cascade ends up with the better option. Therefore, if the game is repeated several times,
we should expect the better option to be chosen more frequently than expected by chance. In our model, it may  easily
happen that the majority of the population chooses the worse option for a long stretch of time.
Imitation is a common and powerful learning strategy for coping with changing environments, a ﬁnding that has repeat-
edly been made (see Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Richerson and Boyd, 2005, and references therein) and which is supported
by our model. In an economic context, this has also been studied by Vriend (2002), who ﬁnds that simulated agents who
learn socially by various strategies can also exhibit, as an overall population, behavior that is detached from reality.
The question we address here is how we should expect aggregate behavior to differ if imitation is a major source of
information acquisition. This has, for instance, implications for the efﬁciency of markets.
2. Model description
2.1. Basic structure
A number of simulated agents faces a task that requires them to make decisions based on available information. More
precisely, they have to choose repeatedly between two options with different payoff prospects,3 A and B. These could be
thought of as stocks and bonds with risky returns or as two consumption goods from different brands whose payoff is
measured in utility derived from their use (say, PC vs Mac). Any two  types of options whose performance is uncorrelated
will do.
In a given period t, options from class A give a return of 1 with probability pA and a return of 0 otherwise, while options
from class B give a return of 1 with probability pB. Expected payoffs are hence pA and pB. The experiences of the agents are
independent, even if they have chosen the same option. Thus one agent could receive a return of 1 after choosing A in period
t, while another agent receives 0 despite choosing the same option.
Choices have to be made repeatedly. After every period, the option is discarded and the agents have to pick again. But
pA and pB also change after every period. They increase by an increment (0.02 in the standard parameter setting) with
probability 1 − pi and decrease by the same increment otherwise. The probabilities therefore have a tendency to decrease if
larger and increase if smaller than 0.5 – they revert to the mean.
pA and pB are unknown to the agents at all time. However, after each period, they can observe whether they received
a payment or not, and from that they can draw conclusions as to how large the success probability of the chosen type of
option might be. The agents hence ﬁnd themselves in a situation of uncertainty: They do not know the expected returns from
either option, and they could only correctly determine them by sampling from each many times. During that time, however,
the underlying probabilities will already have changed. Agents therefore never perfectly know the underlying probabilities
that characterize the environment and have to ﬁnd other ways to deal with this situation of Knightian uncertainty (Knight,
1921).
We  model two types of agents, who follow different strategies:
Individual Learners base their decision only on their own experience and not on the behavior of others. In particular,
they practice reinforcement learning (cf. Kaelbling et al., 1996), i.e. they pick their assets according to a trial-and-
error-method. Since pA and pB are ﬂuctuating, the choice between A and B has to be updated constantly. Individual
learners, therefore, have a memory that allows them to draw on earlier experiences, discounting it exponentially
to account for gradual changes in the environment. The discount rate was  set to 0.9, which preliminary analysis
showed to be optimal.
Social Learners do not rely on their own experience, but learn strictly from other agents. For this, they sample a number
of agents in every period and pick the option that the wealthiest among those sampled chose – a strategy that we
call “imitate the wealthiest” (ITW).Another approach to model individual learners would be to use Bayesian learning instead. We  could show, however, that
even if Bayesian learners were given a huge informational advantage, they were at best very slightly better than individual
3 This is similar to previous works (Rogers, 1988; Feldman et al., 1996; Henrich and Boyd, 1998; Wakano et al., 2004; McElreath et al., 2008; Kendal et al.,
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earners. The reason for this is that the Bayesian learning process is confronted with too much noise to form the reasonably
ccurate beliefs compared to the speed at which the environment changes. As Bayesian learning was not found to be a
uge improvement over reinforcement learning by exponential discounting, all the while being much more complex and
nrealistic, we used reinforcement learning as the individual learning strategy. More details on reinforcement learning are
iven below in Section 2.2.1; more information on Bayesian individual learning is in section A of the Appendix.
We decided to have social learners imitate the wealthiest individuals and not those with the highest short-run payoff
or two reasons. First, since there are only two payoffs in our model (0 and 1), simply imitating individuals who  have been
uccessful in the last period does not really provide much information, as they might have been lucky or unlucky. In any case,
here would always be several lucky and unlucky individuals among those observed, so that social learning would become
lmost purely stochastic, instead of really allowing for the imitation of success. Second, we  argue that wealth (as the sum of
ast successes) can actually be easier to observe in the real economy than short-term success. Who  knows whether a stock
rader had a good or bad day yesterday, or whether a large company will make money on its latest production decision?
ut the stock trader’s penthouse and six-seven-ﬁgure bonus, and the companies’ capital surplus and stock market value, are
here for all to see.
We  also studied other social learning strategies as well as strategies that mix  individual and social learning that were
roposed in the literature. Overall, we found that pure social learning was the most successful strategy. More on those forms
f social learning can be found in section B of the Appendix.
Our model is evolutionary in the sense that the frequency of the different learning strategies is adjusted after each
eneration according to how well the strategies perform. A generation consists of 50 periods, during which the strategies
earn and adjust their choice. Depending on their success, they accumulate wealth, which is translated to ﬁtness. When a
eneration ends, each agent contributes a number of offspring to the offspring pool that is equal to the agent’s ﬁtness. Of
his offspring pool, 10,000 offspring are drawn at random, so that the total population size remains constant at 10,000.4 This
lgorithm is called Fisher-Wright process (Fisher, 1930; Wright, 1931) and is commonly used for evolutionary modeling.
ffspring inherit from their parent only the learning strategy and their ﬁrst period’s choice, mutations do not occur.
There are thus two sources of stochasticity in our model. First, the individual’s probabilities to succeed depend on pA and
B but are independent, so that two individuals with the same choice can still face different outcomes. When two individuals
hoose different options, the one who chooses the better option is more likely to succeed than the other but the opposite
ay  also occur. Second, natural selection itself has a random component. An individual with a higher lifetime success than
nother individual has a higher number of expected offspring but may  at the end contribute less offspring to the next
eneration. By choosing a high population size (10,000) and a low base ﬁtness, we make sure, though, that performance on
he choice task and not random drift (Ohta, 1992) is the main determinant in guiding selection.
All Simulations were run on Matlab 7.0 and 8.0 (The MathWorks, Inc.).
.2. The agents’ learning strategies
.2.1. Individual learning – reinforcement
There are several ways to simulate a strategy of reinforcement learning. In its most simplistic form, it would amount to a
in-stay lose-shift strategy (Robbins, 1952). As the name suggests, this strategy would consist of sticking with an asset type
hen it had a positive return in the previous period and switching otherwise. However, performance would be low: As we
odel our environment as stochastic, a failure with asset type A after a sequence of successes with it should not promptly
ead to a switch. The fact that A was good in the past periods is an indicator that it is good in the present period; switching
ay be premature. To allow individual learners to take account of that, we give them a memory of past events. If A led to
any successes in the previous periods, the propensity towards choosing A increases and a single miss does not sufﬁce to
nduce a switch.
For the purpose of our model, we assume that individuals have a propensity, Pi, for each option i. This propensity is
ncreased if the option is reinforced; in our case, that means it is reinforced by the amount Ri if the option yields success.
ere Ri is equal to 1 if the option was chosen and yielded success and −1 otherwise. In addition, the propensity of each
eriod depends on the propensity of the last period but discounted by a decay factor, q. That gives the propensity for option
 in period t as
Pi(t) = q · Pi(t − 1) + Ri(t − 1)
nder the assumption that, as in our model, choices are made at the end of a period and determine success in the next period.




1 + exp(−P(t)) (1)
4 This number is estimated to be the effective population size of humans during the last 1 million years (Takahata, 1993; Harding et al., 1997).
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where
P(t) ≡ PA(t) − PB(t)
≡ q · P(t − 1) + RA(t − 1) − RB(t − 1).
(2)
When A yielded a success, RA(t − 1) = 1, while a failure with A results in RA(t − 1) = −1. The same is true for RB(t − 1) when
B is chosen. The propensity of the option that was  not chosen remains the same. Therefore, RA(t − 1) − RB(t − 1) equals 1 if A
yielded success or B did not and it equals −1 if A did not yield success or B did. We can thus deﬁne:
R(t − 1) ≡
{
1 A successful or B not
−1 B successful or A not
Inserting this in the deﬁnition of P  (Eq. (2)), we  get:
P(t) = q · P(t − 1) + R(t − 1) (3)
Inserting Eq. (3) in Eq. (1), we get:
PrA(t) = 1 − PrB(t) =
1
1 + exp(−P(t)) =
1
1 + exp(−q · P(t − 1) − R(t − 1))
An additional modiﬁcation of reinforcement learning can be implemented. The sensitivity factor, , alters the steepness
of the probability of choosing an option as a function of the propensity of that option (see e.g. in Klucharev et al., 2009):
PrA(t) = 1 − PrB(t) =
1
1 + exp (− · P(t))
The higher , the steeper the adjustment of the probability.
When  =∞, this results in a simple threshold function that prescribes to choose A if propensity for A exceeds propensity




1 P(t) > 0
0.5 P(t) = 0
0  P(t) < 0
We  found performance not to increase when using a  /= ∞ in contrast to just using the threshold function. Therefore,
we just used the threshold function and ignored the additional parameter .
2.2.2. Social learning – imitate the wealthiest
Social learners make their decision after observing the (last-period) decisions of others. In our model, we  not only allow
social learners to observe the decisions of others (which would only allow some sort of conformist strategy), but also let
them observe the number of successes of the individuals – i.e. their wealth. The social learners then imitate the last-period
choice of the most successful individual they observe – a strategy we call “imitate the wealthiest” (ITW). Unless otherwise
stated, the particular realization of this strategy that we choose for our work is to sample seven individuals and choose the
same option as the wealthiest among them chose in the previous period. In reality, information about the aggregated payoff
could be derived by observing another individual’s lifetime reproductive success, her prestige in the population, or simply
her total monetary wealth.
Observing the choices of others would also a conformist strategy to exist (Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Henrich and Boyd,
1998; Giraldeau et al., 2002). Conformists observe what options other individuals choose and adopt the most frequent option
with a probability greater than what would be expected from random sampling. In robustness checks, we found conformism
to perform much worse than ITW. Earlier works have studied strategies called “imitate the best” (Vega-Redondo, 1997;
Schlag, 1999; Huck et al., 1999; Apesteguia et al., 2007) but such strategies correspond more closely to payoff-biased social
learning, as only the last period’s payoff and not the total payoff is used as information. ITW is instead more akin to prestige-
biased social learning (Henrich and Gil-White, 2001), but note that our model does not include idiosyncratic differences
except for learning strategies and personal histories of decisions and outcomes, so that prestige cannot, e.g. depend on the
personal skill level.
Payoff-biased social learning may  at ﬁrst seem to be a simpler alternative to ITW. It requires the observation of the
short-term success (income) of others instead of the long-term success (wealth). Information about the long-term success
is, however, more readily available than information about the short-term success. Whether someone drives a big car, wears
designer suits, or owns a big house, i.e. facts that can be easily observed, is more dependent on wealth than on income. The
permanent income hypothesis (Friedman, 1957) further supports the view that short-term ﬂuctuations in income should
have little impact on consumption decisions; consumption can therefore not be used to infer short-term income changes.
Firms like banks, on the other hand, are often only required to disclose their ﬁnancial data on a quarterly basis or even less
frequently; privately held companies often do not disclose them at all. Therefore, it is difﬁcult for competitors to infer the
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From a modeling perspective, payoff-biased social learning is also more complicated than ITW. As, after each period, each
bserved individual is either successful or not (payoff of 1 or 0), many individuals will be tied for the highest payoff. A simple
ecision mechanism as “imitate the most successful in this period” is thus impossible. Instead, some form of integration of
he observations is necessary. For example, the average income of each option could be calculated (McElreath et al., 2008);
r the social learner could sum up the total success of each option and then compare them. In any case, these mechanisms
equire more sophisticated cognitive processes and are therefore less likely to be applied. Nevertheless, we tested such
ayoff-biased social learning strategies as well. We  discuss those in more detail in the Appendix.
We assume that information on the history of choices of other individuals is unavailable, as well as information on the
trategy used by other individuals. That means that social learners cannot base their choice on the last three choices of a
ampled individual, just as it is usually possible to observe someone’s current behavior, but not necessarily past behaviors in
eal world situations (in a changing environment such as ours, it would usually also not be advisable to look back for too many
eriods). Social learners are also not able to exclusively sample individual learners, since we  assume that while the current
hoices of others are observable, their underlying strategy is not. As the number of social learners in the population increases,
t therefore becomes more likely that social learners imitate others who, themselves, have not learned by experience but
ave only been imitating others.
Most economic models of learning have assumed that individuals pay a certain cost to learn which of the options is better
cf. Grossman and Stiglitz, 1976, 1980). The same is true for most gene-culture coevolution models (Rogers, 1988; Feldman
t al., 1996; Kameda and Nakanishi, 2002; Wakano et al., 2004; Enquist et al., 2007; Kendal et al., 2009), which are similar in
ature to our model. In such models, the cost of social learning is assumed to be lower than the cost of learning individually.
he main advantage of social learning is then the lower cost of acquiring the information itself. We  do not implement
xogenous costs of learning. This is not because we think they do not exist, but rather because we want to focus on the
nformational advantage of learning socially. For instance, individual learning might result in a certain probability to choose
he better of the two options. If social learning can improve this probability, the social learner would have an advantage
ecause she faces reduced uncertainty and not because of lower learning costs. Our analysis thus shifts the emphasis from
aving the costs of learning individually to the beneﬁts of learning socially.
.3. Description of a simulation run
This section describes the chronology of a simulation. Pseudocode for the simulations can be found in section E of the
ppendix. The parameters used in the description are the standard parameters used to generate most of the results in this
aper. We  have conducted extensive checks to make sure that our results are robust to changes in the parameters. Robustness
hecks were done with Latin hypercube sampling (see section B of the Appendix for robustness checks).
.3.1. Initiation
10,000 agents are generated, 9000 of them individual learners and 1000 social learners. They all receive an endowment
“base ﬁtness”) of 10. pA and pB, the success probabilities of the two options, are start at 0.5.
.3.2. What happens in period t?
At the beginning of every period, the agents observe whether their choice was  successful in the last period, i.e. whether
hey received a payoff of 1 or 0 in period t − 1. This payoff is then added to their wealth. After each agent has observed her
wn payoff, she makes another choice between A and B.
The individual learners make this choice based on their previous experience (see explanations on reinforcement learning
bove). Each social learner randomly samples seven other agents (if not stated otherwise), and adopts the last-period choice
f the wealthiest among these agents as her own choice. In the ﬁrst period of each new generation, the newborn agents,
ot yet having made any observation, make the same choice as their “parent” in the last period. In the very ﬁrst period of
he simulation, all agents make a random choice between the two options, since they have no information upon which they
ould act.
Parallelly (and unobservably for the agents), pA and pB change according to the mean-reverting random-walk process
escribed above. This means that the success probabilities of the two agents have changed slightly from when the agents
ade their choices.
Now, after each agent has chosen either A or B and the new probabilities pA and pB are set, the payoff of each agent is
ealized. If an agent has chosen A, for example, she will receive a payoff of 1 with probability pA and a payoff of 0 with
robability 1 − pA. Then the next period, t + 1, begins. During a generation, agents never change their strategy (individual vs
ocial learning), only their choices (A or B) change.
.3.3. What happens between generations?
Every 50 periods (if not stated otherwise), all agents “die” and get replaced by 10,000 new agents. The information thathe agents have collected so far is eliminated with them, and the new agents do not possess any information – just like the
ew-born agents in the ﬁrst period. Wealth is also not inherited, all agents start with the same base endowment.
The new-born agents are also either individual or social learners, and the frequency of each type is determined by an
volutionary process. Speciﬁcally, every agent in the new generation is the “offspring” of an agent from the old generation,
272 B. Bossan et al. / Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 112 (2015) 266–288Fig. 2. Mean (thick line) and percentiles in steps of 10 (thin lines) of the frequency of social learners over time. Panel A: all 1000 simulations. Panel B: only
for  the parameter space with generation length tmax > 19 and sample size >6.
where the parent’s type (i.e. strategy) and ﬁrst-period choice but not her information or wealth is inherited by her offspring.
The more wealth an agent has assembled at the end of the generation, the more offspring she will produce. Evolution occurs
according to a Fisher–Wright process (Fisher, 1930; Wright, 1931): Every agent has one offspring for each unit of wealth she
possesses at the end of her lifetime. From this combined pool of offspring (usually consisting of several hundred thousand
agents), 10,000 agents are randomly chosen to comprise the next generation.
As a simple example, assume that there are 5000 individual and social learners each, but that after 50 periods the social
learners have on average 50% more wealth than the individual learners. Then the expected distribution in the next generation
is 4000 individual and 6000 social learners; the real distribution can differ because the offspring are drawn randomly from
the offspring pool.
So while the type of every agent (and therefore the frequency of agent-types in the population) stays constant throughout
a period, the next generation will usually have a different composition of individual and social learners. Especially if there
are very few agents of one type left, and their wealth is not hugely superior to that of the agents of the other type, these
agents can be wiped out entirely by the stochastic evolutionary process.
2.3.4. End of the simulation
The simulation ends after 5000 generations (i.e. 250,000 periods), or when one type of agent dies out and all 10,000
agents have the same type.
3. Results
3.1. Evolution of social learners
Before analyzing the consequences of abundant social learning, we have to establish whether social learning would
indeed be favored by an evolutionary process. To do this, we  ran 1000 simulations with parameter values randomly drawn
through Latin hypercube sampling. The parameters we changed were the mean value of pA and pB, the reversion factor of
the environment, the size of steps at which the environment changes, the number of periods per generation, the sample size
of social learners, and the inﬂuence of skill (see section B of the Appendix for more details). The main results are shown in
Fig. 2.
Panel A shows the mean frequency of social learners, as well as percentiles in steps of 10, from all 1000 simulations. The
mean frequency reaches 81.2% after 5000 generations, with a slight upwards trend even at the end of the 5000 generations.
The frequency of social learners at the end of the simulation rarely takes intermediate values. Instead, their frequency after
5000 generations was less than 1% in 118 of the 1000 simulations and more than 99% for 689 simulations. This means that
either social learners or individual learners dominate, with few cases of intermediate equilibria.
The apparent scarcity of stable equilibria might seem puzzling at ﬁrst. Theoretically, individual and social learners should
coexist if their performance is roughly identical. The performance of individual learners is frequency-independent, since
they will be right or wrong the same number of times regardless of how many other individual or social learners there are.
The performance of social learners, on the other hand, is frequency-dependent, since a higher frequency of social learners in
the population makes it more likely that a social learner samples other social learners. At a high frequency, social learners,
mostly imitating other social learners, should start to lose touch with reality and perform worse than individual learners.
Therefore, stable equilibria should be expected.






























wFig. 3. Performance of individual and social learners as a function of their frequencies (each frequency was simulated 1000 times).
To explain why we ﬁnd few cases of coexistence, have a look at Fig. 3. It shows the mean performance of individual and
ocial learners from 1000 simulations (standard errors of the mean are shown for social learners) using the default parameter
ettings. An equilibrium is to be expected at the intersection of the lines representing the performance of social and of
ndividual learners. It lies between 0.2% and 0.01% individual learners. This equilibrium is technically stable, because social
earners perform worse when more frequent and better when less frequent. However, at such a low frequency, individual
earners are frail to become extinct due to stochastic effects. The apparent scarcity of stable equilibria is thus caused by the
quilibrium frequency of social learners being so close to 1 that stochastic effects lead to extinction of individual learners.5
Among the 7 parameters that we changed to check our results and obtain the results presented in Fig. 2, the two most
mportant were the number of periods per generation, tmax, and the sample size (see Appendix, section B). As we show in the
ppendix, a small tmax (below 20) leads to lower frequencies of social learners because there is simply less time (measured
n periods) for social learners to become more frequent, and random processes instead of correct choices determine success
n the evolutionary process. Relative ﬁtness differences, which determine the speed of evolution, are also necessarily smaller
hen there is a base ﬁtness and the number of periods per generation is small.
The sample size of social learners, on the other hand, is the only tested parameter that is rather a property of the agent
nd not of the environment. Although we included it in the robustness analysis, arguably evolutionary forces would ﬁx it at
he optimal level, given the constraints.6 To have a more clear picture of how sample size and tmax affect the frequency of
ocial learners, we again show mean and percentiles, but this time for the parameter space of tmax ≥ 20 and sample size ≥7
Fig. 2, Panel B). We  ﬁnd the mean frequency of social learners to be 99.5%, and in 97,8% of all such simulations individual
earners had died out completely by the end of the simulation. In this parameter space, in which generations are long enough
o allow for differences between the strategies to make a real difference and in which social learners observe the choices of
nough individual learners, social learners almost always completely replace individual learners regardless of how we set
he other tested parameters of the model.
The emphasis of our work is the consequence for aggregate behavior when imitation is the dominant form of learning.
hree major consequences are shown in the following sections: exaggeration, delayed response to changes, and detachment
f behavior from reality.
.2. Exaggeration
The behavior of individual learners is independent of the population that surrounds them. The behavior of social learners,
owever, depends on that of other individuals – their decisions (as well as their performance) are frequency-dependent. To
tudy the behavior of social learners, it is thus necessary to indicate their frequency in the population. Fig. 4 illustrates the
ehavior of individual learners and social learners at different frequencies in a randomly generated environment. Panel A
hows the behavior of individual learners (solid line, left hand scale) in a population consisting only of individual learners.
e see that their choices quickly catch up with changes in pA − pB, the difference in the success probabilities of options A and
 (dashed line, right hand scale). When this difference is close to zero, approximately half of the individual learners choose A
nd the other half B. If pA exceeds pB by 10%, approximately 60% of individual learners choose A. Linear regressions show that
5 Of course, the simulations that led to the extinction of social learners are most easily explained: Individual learners just outperformed them on the
hole range of frequencies.
6 We put an upper limit of 11 on the sample size.
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the proportion of A choices xA is best approximated by xA = 0.5 + 1.036 · (pA − pB), an almost one to one correspondence.
We thus say that the individual learners “match” the probabilities (Baum, 1979).7
Selection will act to increase the frequency of social learners to very high levels. The resulting behavior is illustrated in
the other panels of Fig. 4. Panel B shows the behavior of a population consisting of 50% individual learners and 50% social
learners (thick line, left hand scale). The proportion of A choices made by social learners stays close to the proportion of A
choices made by individual learners. However, instead of matching the probabilities, the social learners “exaggerate”.8 Linear
regression shows that a 1% point increase in pA − pB is matched by a 1.795% point increase in A choices. Panel C displays
a population consisting of 2% individual learners and of 98% social learners. Here, social learners strongly exaggerate. In
the most extreme case, the population consists solely of social learners, as shown in Panel D. Lacking input from individual
learners, eventually, all social learners will choose the same option and never again switch away from it. This shows that
social learners require individual learners to be able to adapt to the environment.
Theoretically, the best strategy is to always choose A if pA > pB and B otherwise. The best strategy should thus completely
exaggerate even small differences in probabilities. Exaggeration is therefore efﬁcient, as long as the direction is correct.
Individual learners match probabilities quite closely, meaning that their performance will at best be moderate. In contrast,
social learners tend to exaggerate, especially when they are very frequent. Social learners are thus closer to optimal behavior
than individual learners, which explains why they have, at least initially, a higher ﬁtness and become more frequent in the
population.
3.3. Delay
It is already clear from Fig. 4 that individual learners react to changes in the environment with a small delay (or lag) and
that this delay is larger for social learners. This section elaborates the inﬂuence of imitation on delays.
The delay in the adaption of social learners to changes in the environment is presumably frequency-dependent – the
more social learners there are, the more they will learn from one another and hence the greater the delay with which they
process ‘actual’ information provided by individual learners. To examine this, we determined the cross-correlation between
behavior, measured as the proportion of A choices, and environment, measured as pA − pB. The peak of the cross-correlation
indicates the average lag between behavior and environment; the later the peak, the slower the strategy is in adopting. The
magnitude of the correlation indicates how strict the strategy adheres to the environment. The lower the magnitude, the
less strict is the correspondence between behavior and environment.
Simulation results conﬁrmed our expectations, as shown in Fig. 5. Individual learners start with a high cross-correlation
for small delays that decreases rather fast for higher delays (conﬁdence intervals are of the magnitude ±0.009.). This closely
7 The reader should be aware that this is not the exact deﬁnition of matching as in the psychological literature (Herrnstein, 1961; Baum, 1979) and that
it  is contested how robust matching is (Vulkan, 2000).
8 Baum (1979) refers to a similar effect as “overmatching”.

































mFig. 5. Cross-correlation between behavior and environment, based on 50,000 periods; frequency of social learners as indicated.
orresponds to the autocorrelation of the environment, meaning that on average, individual learners track environmental
hanges very closely. For a frequency of 50%, social learners have a cross-correlation that is close to that of individual learners
ut already lags behind by several more periods and tracks the environment less closely. While selection works to increase
he frequency of social learners, the cross-correlation of their behavior with the environment declines steadily and the
eak is shifted to higher delays. Thus the behavior of social learners becomes more and more detached from environmental
hanges until it is hardly connected with the environment at all.
This development also entails that social learners’ performance becomes worse as their overall frequency grows – not
ecause they stop exaggerating but because their behavior starts to seriously lag behind the environmental ﬂuctuations.
xaggeration is only efﬁcient if the choice is exaggerated in the correct direction, which becomes more and more unlikely
ith increasing lag.
.4. Relation between behavior and reality
The fundamental information that is crucial in our model is whether A or B is the better option to choose, which depends
n whether pA or pB is currently greater. If a clever observer were to draw conclusions from the observed individuals’ behavior
n the underlying fundamentals, she might use the heuristic “choose A if more than x percent of market participants choose
 and choose B otherwise”. If x is chosen wisely and behavior always reﬂects the environmental state, this strategy should
ead to correct inferences at all time. In contrast, if behavior does not reﬂect the environmental state, we  should expect a
ow accuracy.
Using the described heuristic and a threshold x that ex post maximizes the number of correct inferences, we analyzed
ow often these inferences were correct as a function of the studied strategy (for more details on this analysis, see section
 of the Appendix). For individual learners, we found that behavior indeed allows to infer the environmental state with
igh accuracy (88.19% correct). For social learners at 50% frequency, inferences were still quite accurate (82.87% correct).
owever, when social learners become more abundant, inference becomes less accurate (68.69% for a frequency of 99%,
1.56% for a frequency of 99.9%), reaching a level only hardly above that of guessing. In the short run, behavior of social
earners at high frequency does thus not reﬂect the environment very well.
We were interested in whether these inferences become more accurate when short-term trends in the environment are
eglected. To test this, we used a moving average ﬁlter that smoothes out short run trends in the environment. The greater
he ﬁlter size, the longer the remaining trends are. Re-analysis of the inference accuracy showed that indeed the behavior
f social learners reﬂects changes in the environment when long-term trends are considered (Fig. 6). For social learners at
9% frequency, accuracy can reach up to 90.70% for trends of 88 periods length and for social learners at 99.9% frequency,
ccuracy can reach up to 85.62% for trends of 224 periods length. In summary, the behavior of social learners does indeed
eﬂect changes in the environment quite well, but only if short-term trends are ignored.
. Discussion
.1. Methods and assumptions
The plausibility of the model we have developed here and the conclusions we will draw is based on a chain of three
ain arguments. First, economic agents imitate one another, and especially imitate successful (i.e. wealthy) individuals.
econd, this is the case because imitation is in itself successful and will hence become more common over time through the
volutionary forces of the market. Third, the effects of this cannot be understood in the aggregate, but rather each agent
ust be modeled on her own to show the potentially unexpected macro-effects of micro-behavior.
276 B. Bossan et al. / Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 112 (2015) 266–288Fig. 6. Percentage of correct inferences from behavior to environment as function of moving average ﬁlter length applied to the environment, based on
50,000 periods; frequency of social learners as indicated.
All of these arguments are debatable. There might not be that much imitation in our societies, or it might not be focused
that much on the especially wealthy. But additionally to the empirical examples cited in the introduction, our story is also
plausible if we consider the incentives of economic agents: Whether placing the same bet as some of the most successful
players is optimal or not, it will certainly serve to protect oneself against too harsh consequences if one should be wrong –
after all, how can one be blamed for erring along with the crowd or even some of the top names?
Indeed, if one looks closer at speculative market episodes in history, it almost seems as if imitation had been key to every
one of them. Carswell (1960, p. 161) describes the case of a banker at the time of the south sea bubble who got into the
market saying, “when the rest of the world are mad, we  must imitate them in some measure.” And Stewart (1991, p. 97)
concludes that “what really fueled the takeover boom [during the 1980s] was the sight of other people making money, big
money, by buying and selling companies.”
Secondly, how do we know that the “evolutionary” way of thinking is applicable to the ﬁeld of economics at all? In nature,
variation arises randomly and selection is natural (Darwin, 1859), while in economics, both might be the result of conscious
(and social) processes. But we think that the ingredients are sufﬁcient to allow a process analogous to natural selection to
take hold. As Alchian (1950, p. 220) put it:
the economic counterparts of genetic heredity, mutations, and natural selection are imitation, innovation, and positive
proﬁts.
The instruments of evolutionary theory can be applied with caution. As a matter of fact, this way  of reasoning even appears
in what has come to be seen as a cornerstone of modern economic methods: In the chapter “The Case for Flexible Exchange
Rates” in his “Essays in Positive Economics”, Friedman (1953) argues that since a certain kind of speculator would continually
lose money, she would be forced to either leave or change her strategy. Or, in other words: since such speculators could not
survive, they could not exist.
Further critique could be raised with regard to our model choice. We  used agent-based modeling, meaning that each
individual is simulated separately. Therefore, each individual’s personal history – what she chose, whether she was  success-
ful, whom she sampled, whom she imitated – combined with her learning rule, determines her behavior. The alternative
approach would be to aggregate individuals with the same learning strategy. This would require us to calculate probability
distributions over all possible states, which is impossible in such a complex system. As important variables, for example, the
propensities to choose certain options have no simple or ﬁxed distributions, especially when an individual’s history matters.
As small differences can lead to divergent behavior, approximating these variables would not lead to meaningful results.
According to Bonabeau (2002), agent-based modeling is appropriate when (1) there are non-linearities in behavioral rules,
(2) behavior is path-dependent, (3) there is spatial structure, or (4) basins of attraction are small with regard to ﬂuctuations.
Except for (3), all points apply or may  sometimes apply to our system, supporting the use of agent-based modeling.
Finally, for placing the arguments of this paper in the history of economic thought, consider also the view of F.A. Hayek,
who wrote that “all enduring structures . . . up to the brain and society are the results of, and can be explained only in terms
of, processes of selective evolution” Hayek (1979, p. 158). Not only that, but Hayek was, as Vriend (2002) argues, a proponent
of agent-based modeling well before it was possible, and might have engaged in tinkering with Matlab codes were he alive
today.99 For another well-known example of agent-based modeling before sufﬁcient computing power became available see the famous segregation experiment
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.2. Connection to real world phenomena
We  proposed a rather simple evolutionary model that on the one hand contains individual learners, who learn about two
ossible options by relying on own experience, and social learners, who  imitate the choice of the most wealthy individual
hey observe. Surprisingly, the behavior that ensues reﬂects market anomalies that are used to justify the claim that markets
re not efﬁcient. Therefore, social learning could be a simple explanation for market inefﬁciencies. The details of the observed
nomalies are discussed below.
.2.1. Exaggeration
We  found that social learning leads to exaggeration. There are many instances of such exaggeration in economic markets.
hiller (1981) ﬁnds that stock price volatility is “ﬁve to thirteen times too high to be attributed to new information.” In
he short run, Shiller et al. (1984) also ﬁnd evidence for “excess volatility” in the overreaction of stock prices to dividends.
erhaps the most visible, however, is the medium-to-long-run ‘overshooting’ of markets. The typical stock-market index in
he developed world more than doubles from the low to the high point of a business cycle – while few economists would
rgue that the value of the economy’s largest companies undergoes a similar development within just a few years. But we
eed not even look as far as to ﬁnancial markets to ﬁnd examples of exaggeration through imitation. The fact that some tourist
estinations that used to be sanctuaries of the wealthy only years ago are completely overrun now is regularly bemoaned,
nd it certainly exaggerates rather than matches real (or perceived) quality differences. And well-known investors who  have
reviously acquired wealth through good investments have at times proﬁted from the “Buffet effect”, in which prices of a
ecurity they buy are later driven up by imitators.
.2.2. Delay
A higher frequency of social learners leads to a larger delay in incorporating new information into the market. This seems
o contradict the widely held belief, spawned by the efﬁcient-market hypothesis, that markets react to new information not
nly correctly, but also immediately. While that is certainly the case for obvious and unambiguous information – if a reﬁnery
xplodes, the oil price goes up – it is far from being a universal truth. The reader might only look at the recent ﬁnancial crisis,
here problems in the subprime-market took more than a year to reach the stock prices of ﬁnancial institutions that were
olding the assets in question. Obviously, very few deviations from the norm of immediate information diffusion are enough
o make a great difference.
In contrast to the oversimpliﬁed model of markets where equilibrium price reacts to exogenous events with no time delay,
e can offer another interpretation. In our model, information about changes in the environment slowly ﬂows through the
conomy, reaching more and more market participants each period, who  subsequently inﬂuence more market participants.
he higher the degree of imitation, the longer it will take until a critical mass reacts. In times of high social inﬂuence, this
eans that deviations from the hypothetical fundamental value can be upheld for a very long time. To paraphrase a remark
hat is commonly attributed to Keynes: Markets can take much longer to react to the real environment than you and I can
emain solvent.
.2.3. Relation between behavior and fundamental values
For the efﬁciency of markets, it is crucial that the choices of market participants reﬂect fundamentals in some way –
hat “security prices fully reﬂect all available information” (Fama, 1991). We  do not model prices here, but if we take the
ehavior of market participants (which is based on their beliefs about the underlying success probabilities of several options,
hich is also what would drive prices), we can ask: How much does the behavior of the agents in our simulations reﬂect
he real environment? How reliable can the state of nature be inferred from observing the choices made by the agents? We
ound that such inferences were possible with high accuracy when they are based on the behavior of individual learners
r on the behavior of social learners if those were infrequent. When social learning became abundant, however, aggregate
ehavior hardly reﬂected the environmental state. This corresponds to the ﬁnding that dividends and asset prices are not
ighly correlated in the short run (Shiller, 1990).
In addition, we found that when social learning was  very or extremely frequent – as it was bound to become through
volutionary processes – inferences were inaccurate for short-term trends and best for exceedingly long trends (between 88
nd 224 periods). This means that the behavior of social learners does reﬂect environmental changes, but only for long-term
rends. This corresponds to the ﬁnding of high correlation between asset prices and dividends if long but not short time
eriods are considered (Shiller, 1990) and could explain an under-reaction to short- and over-reaction to long-term trends
n stock prices (Barberis et al., 1998).
In our simulation, the accuracy of trying to infer fundamentals from agents’ behavior falls if the frequency of social
earners rises. The recent ﬁnancial crisis of 2008 – if one is still allowed to propose another view on its emergence – showed
 similar mechanism. To calculate risk correlations necessary to correctly price collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), ﬁnance
rofessionals used the spreads of credit default swaps (CDS) as a basis (Li, 2000; Salmon, 2009). Investment bankers charged
ith evaluating CDOs hence relied as “imitative learners” upon others who priced and traded CDSs, assuming that they were
ollecting actual information (or acting as individual learners). But it is not clear whether CDSs where priced correctly, as
istorical data on countrywide default correlation of mortgages, especially of subprime mortgages, were very scarce (Tett,
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2009). The market thus started to imitate imitations of decisions that were based on unreliable data in the ﬁrst place, and
clearly exaggerated the safety (or success probabilities) of these assets.
Then markets began their delayed realization of the underlying values of CDOs. In 2007, Citigroup and Merrill Lynch had
to write down a combined $48.5 billion, mostly because of CDOs on their accounts (The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report). Until
February 2009, total write-downs due to CDOs accumulated to $218.2 billion (Benmelech and Dlugosz, 2009).
Grossman and Stiglitz (1976, 1980) pioneered the work on how social learning might crowd out individual learning from
ﬁnancial markets. Informed and uninformed traders have to decide whether to invest in a risky or a safe asset. Informed
traders can buy a signal (that may  be noisy) which conveys information with regard to the risky asset, whereas uninformed
traders base their decision on the price of the assets. The prices in turn are inﬂuenced partly by the behavior of the informed
traders and thus reﬂect the fundamentals to some degree. Most importantly, the authors assume that the decision to become
informed or stay uninformed is endogenous, meaning that traders switch strategies based on which one leads to the highest
utility. If the noise of the signal goes to zero, the equilibrium frequency of informed traders goes to zero. But without informed
traders, decisions become detached from reality and prices become completely uninformative.
Some of our results are similar to those of Grossman and Stiglitz. In their model, under rare circumstances, a state can be
achieved in which hardly any or no individual at all learns about the environment. In our model, this also happens but occurs
under very general circumstances. We  neither have to assume that individual learning is more costly than social learning,
nor that individual learners can completely eliminate uncertainty.
5. Conclusion
We  have shown, by means of evolutionary simulations, that imitating others in decisions whose success depends on the
environment can be a good strategy, and can even return more favorable results than trying to learn about the environment
by oneself. This is because imitators will often decidedly choose the better option, while individual learners choose the
worse option with a moderately high probability. However, when the environment changes, social learners are also quite
likely to decidedly choose the wrong option for some time, while individual learners will adjust their choice more quickly.
Keynes (1936, p.158) seemed to have a model not entirely dissimilar to ours in mind when he distinguished between
“speculators”, who try to predict “the psychology of the markets”, and “enterprise”, meaning those who actually try their
hand at “forecasting the prospective yields of assets.” The analogy to social and individual learners is not too far-fetched.
Keynes famously goes on to write that,
Speculators may  do no harm as bubbles on a steady stream of enterprise. But the position is serious when enterprise becomes
the bubble on a whirlpool of speculation.
In the simulation runs of our model, we have observed that the imitators, even if they start out as bubbles on a stream of
individual learners, will soon become the torrent which drowns out what little information the individual learners gather.
Therefore, even if our method is unusual for an economic study, the argument is not. Markets are powerful information
aggregators which can help in predicting anything, from sporting events (Spann and Skiera, 2009) to presidential elections
(Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004). But they can only fulﬁll their task if enough information “ﬂows” into them. We  have seen that
imitating the successful can enhance an individual’s performance but may  at the same time worsen group performance. If,
as our analysis suggests, information inﬂow is very low in equilibrium, aggregate behavior tends to become self-referential.
Thus, if market participants rely on others to procure information and assume that all their knowledge is accurately reﬂected
in their behavior, market reactions will be exaggerated and delayed, and correspondence between behavior and reality will
be weak.
Appendix A. Individual Bayesian learning
In an attempt to make the individual learners even stronger and behave like the classical rational economic agent, we
also simulated the evolutionary outcome when social learners compete with rational, Bayesian individual learners. For this,
we have to make an assumption about the priors of a Bayesian learner. A generous assumption is to allow the Bayesian
learner to know the total prior distribution of pA and pB – i.e. to assume that the Bayesian learner understands the process
and can rationally infer from her observation, but does not know in which “generation” she is. To derive this distribution,
we simulated pA and pB over the time of 107 periods and used the resulting distribution (panel A of Fig. 7) as the prior. This is
a very generous approach, since other strategies do not have access to this vast amount of information; nor, in fact, do they
even know that there is a ﬁxed probability distribution at all. This should put Bayesian learners in a very favorable position.
Having the priors, a Bayesian learner chooses the option with the higher expected value (or chooses randomly if she is
indifferent). After choosing, the outcome is realized, meaning that the chosen option either leads to success or failure. In
any case, the Bayesian learner updates her belief about the chosen option according to this new bit of information and the
cycle continues. After each generation, parents die and offspring are born. These offspring inherit their ﬁrst period’s choice
but not the priors from their parents; this is analogous to reinforcement learners (the individual learners in our model) who
also inherit their parent’s last choice but not their parent’s propensities.
Even though the probability distribution of pA and pB in the ﬁrst generation or so is usually narrower than the Bayesian
learner’s priors suggest, in later generations their prior distribution quite accurately reﬂects the real distribution. In other























lig. 7. Panel A: Probability distribution of pA and pB . Panel B: Proportion of A choices made by Bayesian learners (left y-axis) as a function of pA − pB (right
-axis) over time.
ords, every new generation of Bayesian learners starts off with a quite accurate picture of how pA and pB are distributed,
nd then proceeds to learn from trial and error what their current realizations are. The latter knowledge is not passed from
eneration to generation. Bayesian learners who use the prior distribution as the basis for learning, then, behave rationally,
s would be expected if it is unknown in which generation one currently is.
Furthermore, we endowed Bayesian learners with the knowledge about the process that generates the environment. This
ay, a Bayesian learner cannot only optimally compute the probability distributions of pA and pB but also predict how these
istributions will change from one period to the other. No other strategy that we tested was given such deep knowledge
bout the environment it is faced with.
The resulting behavior of Bayesian learners can be seen in panel B of Fig. 7. Bayesian learners engage in probability
atching. Discontinuities in behavior after each generation, i.e. after 50 periods, can be observed, reﬂecting the reset of
he priors. With the default parameter values, the performance of Bayesian learners reached 60.15% (±0.67%, S.E.M.), only
lightly above the performance of reinforcement learners.
We  are interested in how well Bayesian learners perform. For this, we  simulated their performance over 1000 generations
sing the default parameter values. Again, we started with 9000 individual learners and 1000 social learners. The picture
hat emerges is the same as in our main setting with reinforcement learning: Social learners quickly rise in frequency and
ventually displace individual learners from the population (Fig. 8). Therefore, Bayesian individual learning does not prevent
he dominance of social learning. To check for robustness, we  varied the number of periods per generation from 25 to 250.
his had little inﬂuence on performance.
The reason why Bayesian learners cannot reach a higher performance is that the feedback from the environment is too
oisy to form correct beliefs. Bayesian learning is not fast enough to keep up with the constantly changing environment.
n conclusion, Bayesian learners, even if given a large informational advantage, can just barely beat reinforcement learning
y exponential discounting. On the other hand, Bayesian learning is much more demanding and less parsimonious than
einforcement learning. A Bayesian learning strategy is thus inappropriate for our task.
ig. 8. Simulated frequency of social learners competing with Bayesian individual learners from ten evolutionary simulations (thin lines), mean (thick
ine).
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Appendix B. Robustness to parameter changes
To check the robustness of our ﬁnding that social learning by imitating the wealthiest is dominant, we repeated the evo-
lutionary simulations while varying the parameter values. We  adopted a Latin hypercube design to sample the parameters.
Overall, we made 1000 simulation runs.
B.1. Tested parameters
Most parameters we  tested inﬂuence the environment. It consists of two options, A and B, whose success probabilities are
pA and pB, respectively. pA and pB change after each period by a certain increment according to a process akin to a random
walk, except that they are bound between 0 and 1 and that they tend to revert to the mean. Several parameters affect how
the environment changes:
• The mean success rate, pmean: The arithmetic mean of pi, i = {A, B}, is 0.5 in the default condition. There is, however, no
particular reason why that should be so. Higher pmean imply that successes are more common and lower pmean that failures
are more common. The wealth of a strategy is the most distinct feature if successes are neither too common nor too rare.
Therefore, we changed the mean success rate and checked whether ITW would still dominate.
• Reversion factor r: pi tends to revert to the mean. For the default condition, that means that if, say, pi is 10/20/30 percentage
points greater than the mean, it sinks in the next period with probability 60/70/80%, and if it is 10/20/30 percentage points
less than the mean, it increases in the next period with probability 60/70/80%. In general, the probability that pi increases
is equal to 0.5 − r × (pi − pmean), with r equaling 1 in the default condition. Higher r imply that there are more switches
between A and B being the better option, and thus that strategies have to adjust faster; ITW should fare worse with higher
r, since it is slower to adapt than individual learners.
• Probability of environmental change, pincr: In the default condition, the environment changes after each period. It could,
however, be possible that in some periods, it remains constant. pincr gives the probability that pA or pB changes after each
period (they move independently). Lower pincr should favor ITW, since it is the slower strategy and gets more time to react
to environmental changes.
• Step size kincr: When pi changes, it increases or decreases by an amount kincr. The default value is kincr = 0.02 . Higher kincr
imply that the environment changes faster, and since it takes fewer steps to move away from the mean, higher kincr also
imply the environment reverts more aggressively to the mean. In sum, both effects should act to decrease the performance
of ITW.
In sum, this is the process that describes how the environment changes from one period to the other:
pi(t + 1) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
pi(t); 1 − pincr
pi(t) + kincr; pincr(0.5 − r × (pi(t) − pmean))
pi(t) − kincr; pincr(0.5 + r × (pi(t) − pmean))
Apart from the factors that affect the environment, there are other factors that might have an inﬂuence on the performance
of ITW.
• Sample size ss: In the default condition, it was determined that the right sample size for ITW is the “magical number seven”
(Miller, 1956), but this number is more or less arbitrary. It may  be possible that ITW cannot beat individual learners if they
could only sample less individuals, which we  decided to test.
• Length of a generation tmax: In the default condition, one generation lasts 50 periods. During this time, strategies learn and
accumulate wealth. After each generation, strategies reproduce and start fresh. When the generation length is very short,
the spread in wealth between the actors could be too low to be informative for ITW. If generations last too long, presently
high wealth could reﬂect successful behavior in the past but not necessarily successful behavior in the present. Therefore,
both too low and too high tmax could be detrimental for the performance of ITW.
• The skill parameter pskill: In our simulations, each individual is the same a priori; nobody has an advantage in performing
the required task. It could be possible, however, that in the real world, some individuals are inherently more skilled than
others and that consequently wealth is not only determined by making good choices but also by being skilled. We thus
introduced skill. If pskill = 0.1, for example, it means that for each individual, at the beginning of a generation, a skill is
drawn from the uniform distribution U(− 0.1, 0.1). This skill is added to the probability to succeed, so if pi = 0.5 and a skill
level of 0.05 is drawn, the actual probability to succeed is 0.55. Skill is determined independently from strategy, cannot be
observed, and cannot be inherited. Increasing pskill implies that wealth depends to a higher degree on skill, which ITW can
neither copy nor account for, and to a lesser degree on a history of making good choices. This should lead to ITW having a
lower performance.
B. Bossan et al. / Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 112 (2015) 266–288 281
Table  1
Parameters that were tested for the robustness analysis. The default value was  used outside of the robustness analysis.
Parameter Explanation Default Distribution Range
pmean Mean value of pA , pB 0.5 0.5 + (x − 0.55)/2 0.2754–0.7247
r  Reversion factor 1 exp(2x) − 1 0.221–6.389
pincr Probability of environmental change 1 x 0.1–1
kincr Step size 0.02 exp(x/20) − 1 0.005–0.051
ss  Sample size 7 round(10x  + 1) 2–11






























pskill Skill factor 0 (x − 0.1)/3 0–0.3a
a A values of pskill of 0.3 corresponds to an R2 of the correlation between wealth and skill of to 0.99.
A short recapitulation of all parameters, their default values, and the changes we made for test robustness, are found in
able 1. The variable x is drawn from a uniform distribution U(0.1, 0.9) according to the Latin hypercube sampling mechanism
mplemented in Matlab.
.2. ITW versus individual learners
We  ran 1000 simulations with social learners using imitate the wealthiest competing against individual learners. The
umber of individuals was 10,000 in all simulations; social learners started with 1000 individuals, individual learners
tarted with 9000 individuals. Every simulation was stopped after 5000 generations. Table 2 shows the estimated regression
arameters (and conﬁdence intervals) from a multivariate model of the type
Frequency of social learners = ˇ1intercept + ˇ2pmean + . . .,
here the frequency of social learners (in percentage points) at the end of the simulation is explained by the model
arameters.
Only three model parameters do at all have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the frequency of social learners. For those parameters,
he sign of the  ˇ conﬁrms the hypothesized trend. A higher r (and also a higher pincr) implies that the environment changes
ore quickly, which should favor individual learners. Sample size, in contrast, correlates positively with the frequency of
ocial learners, which is expected, at least until a certain degree.
The role of tmax is especially important to understand. This parameter correlates strongly and positively with the frequency
f social learners. There are two explanations for that. First, if tmax is too small, i.e. when there are only few periods per
eneration, success is very noisy and thus wealth is a poor predictor for good choice. More periods allow more precise
nference from wealth on good choices. However, one would also expect that if tmax is too large, wealth depends less and
ess on good choices in the last few periods and more and more on good choices made during periods long past. Since the
nvironment probably changed in-between, wealth should become less good of a predictor of recent good decision making
hen tmax is too large. We  will see that this holds true.
There is another reason why the frequency of social learners correlates so strongly with tmax. When tmax is short, there
re only very few opportunities to accumulate ﬁtness differences. Since there is always a ﬁxed base ﬁtness, the lower tmax,
he lower the relative ﬁtness differences between strategies. Therefore, even if social learners were consistently better, it
ould take them longer to increase in frequency when tmax is small.
Therefore, it is plausible that if we had simulated more generations (which was  difﬁcult due to the high computational
un time of the simulations), social learners would have had more time to increase in frequency. This can be conﬁrmed
y looking at the increase of the frequency of social learners at the end of the simulations as a function of tmax. If social
earners simply did not have enough time to reach equilibrium frequency when tmax is too small, we would expect the slope
f their frequency to be higher for smaller tmax. This is indeed the case, as can be seen in Fig. 9. We determined the slope
f the frequency of social learners during the last 1000 generations and found it to be greater the smaller tmax (conﬁdence
ntervals are too small to be shown, ±6 ·10−4). This implies that social learners would have reached an even higher frequency,
specially for small tmax, had the simulations run for more generations.
able 2
’s and their 95% conﬁdence intervals for the multiple linear regression of the frequency of social learners at the end of the simulations onto the parameters.
parameter  ˇ ˇ, 95% CI
Intercept 0.572 0.074; 1.069
pmean −0.043 −0.208; 0.123
r  −0.217 −0.299; −0.134
pincr −0.120 −0.287; 0.047
kincr 0.121 −0.045; 0.287
ss  0.235 0.071; 0.399
tmax 0.4473 0.282; 0.612
pskill −0.018 −0.182; 0.147

































frequencyFig. 9. Slope of the regression of frequency of social learners during the last 1000 generations (circles, left y-axis) as a function of tmax (x-axis, log scale).
Mean frequencies of social learners (squares, right y-axis) and their standard errors of the mean (dashed line) are shown for comparison.
As a comparison, Fig. 9 also shows the mean frequency of social learners. It shows that there is an almost inverse rela-
tionship between mean and slope, which means that the lower the mean frequency of social learners, the more it would
increase had the simulations run for longer. It also conﬁrms that when tmax becomes too high, the mean frequency of social
learners drops slightly; they do best for intermediate values of tmax.
B.3. Additional social learning strategies
Until now, we assumed that social learning is achieved by imitating the wealthiest. However, there are other possible
forms of social learning. Those other social learning strategies could, hypothetically, prevent the total domination of social
learning we saw until now and thus circumvent the more extreme behavioral responses we discussed in the main text. This
can be achieved in two fashions. First, it is possible that the presence of other social learning strategies stabilizes individual
learning and thus prevents it being marginalized. Second, if the social learning strategies rely, as part of their strategy, on
sometimes learning individually, this could also prevent the extreme effects.
We added social learning strategies that were already discussed in the literature. These social learning strategies are:
• Conformism: Conformism has been discussed extensively in the past (Boyd and Richerson, 1982, 1985; Henrich and Boyd,
1998) In our simulation, this strategy relies on sampling a number of individuals and adapting the option that was most
frequently observed in the sample. Initial tests established that conformists were the most efﬁcient when sampling three
individuals. We  thus set the sample size of conformists to three.
• Opportunistic individual learning: This strategy is inspired by Enquist et al. (2007) and consists of learning socially by
default but switching to individual learning if the last period’s choice was  not followed by a success (hence the name). In
the original paper, social learning consisted simply of copying a random individual, but since conformism is superior to
random copying, we instead used conformism as playing the part of social learning.
• Opportunistic conformists: This strategy is inspired by Rendell et al. (2010) and consists of using individual learning by
default but switching to social learning if the last period’s choice was  not followed by a success. It is thus the converse
of the opportunistic individual learning. Again, instead of random copying, we  used conformism as the social learning
mechanism.
• In doubt, conform: This strategy was ﬁrst proposed by Boyd and Richerson (1995). It consists of relying on individual
learning if the actor is sufﬁciently certain that she knows what option is better, and relying on social learning if not.
Again, we used conformism for the social learning part. We  deﬁned an actor as certain about her choice if the difference
in propensities between the option is sufﬁciently large. The required difference was determined in initial tests so as to
maximize performance.
• Payoff-biased social learning is a social learning strategy that relies only on observations directly linked to the previous
period. One type of payoff-biased social learning uses a scoring system reminiscent of the Borda count from social choice
theory (Borda, 1781) but allowing for differential weighing of observed successes and failures. Scoring has the advantage
that only this type obeys certain axioms of rational behavior (Young, 1975). Among all possible combinations of weights,
it was found that weights of 1 on observed successes and 0 on observed failures, as well as 4 on observed successes and
−1 on observed failures, prove particularly successful (Bossan, 2013), which is why we included these strategies here.
Interestingly, conformism can be interpreted as a special case of payoff-biased social learning with equal positive weight
on observed gains and failures.
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tig. 10. Mean (thick line) and percentiles in steps of 10 (thin lines) of the frequencies of individual learners (top left), imitate the wealthiest (top right),
he  three strategies using a mix  of individual and social learning (bottom left), and the ﬁve payoff-biased social learning strategies including conformism
bottom right).
Payoff-biased social learning based on comparing averages has been shown to be quite successful (McElreath et al., 2008).
We include this strategy, as well as a modiﬁcation of it that trades off payoff and conformism, which was shown to be
even more successful (see (Bossan, 2013), for more explanations). What is interesting about this latter strategy is that it
produces effects that are very similar to those produced by ITW (Bossan, 2013).
In addition to those eight strategies, we added pure individual learning and social learning by imitating the wealthiest,
he social learning strategy we focus on in this work. These ten strategies were again tested, using the different parameter
ettings described in the previous section and 200 simulations with Latin hypercube sampling. The main results are shown
n Fig. 10.
On the top left, we see the frequency of individual learners. They quickly diminish in frequency, averaging at 0.27% after
000 generations. We  also tested three strategies that use a mix  of individual and social learning, namely opportunistic indi-
idual learning, opportunistic conformism, and in doubt, conform. These strategies were also not very successful, averaging
t 6.85%. Imitate the wealthiest did a little better, reaching 10.99% after 5000 generations. The most successful were the ﬁve
ayoff-biased social learning strategies, reaching 81.89%.
These results show that ITW does not necessarily perform so well against other, quite sophisticated social learning
trategies, though it still performs a lot better than individual learning or other strategies that rely partly on individual
earning. Instead, another form of pure social learners, payoff-biased social learners, dominate. Interestingly, among those,
he strategy relying on averaging and payoff-conformism trade-off is the most frequent (46.01%). Though this suggests that
TW might not be the altogether best strategy to deal with a situation as described in our model, the point of this paper
s not that ITW beats all other strategies, but that it beats individual learning strategies very clearly and thus leads to a
ominance of social learner with the effects described above. As a matter of fact, simulations by Bossan (2013) have shown
hat the strategy relying on averaging and payoff-conformism trade-off produces very similar effects to the ones described
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Table  3
Linear regression analysis of behavior on environment based on 50,000 data points; slopes including 95% conﬁdence intervals, R2, and sum of square errors
are  indicated, p-values too small to report.
Strategy Frequency (%) Slope (95% C.I.) R2 S.S.E.
Individual learners – 1.047 (1.041–1.054) 0.6784 243.6
Social  learners 10 1.743 (1.730–1.756) 0.5667 1088.3
Social  learners 30 1.753 (1.740–1.767) 0.5648 1137.6
Social learners 50 1.795 (1.781–1.809) 0.5599 1233.2
Social  learners 70 1.834 (1.819–1.849) 0.5370 1404.2
Social  learners 90 1.934 (1.915–1.952) 0.4627 2170.4
Social  learners 95 1.887 (1.866–1.907) 0.3980 2729.0
Social  learners 99 1.612 (1.584–1.641) 0.1974 4950.7
Social  learners 99.8 1.392 (1.359–1.425) 0.1191 7143.8
Social  learners 99.9 1.184 (1.149–1.219) 0.0799 7850.3
Social  learners 99.99 0.667 (0.628–0.707) 0.0214 9946.9
Table 4
Linear regression analysis of behavior on environment based almost 50,000 data points; slopes including 95% conﬁdence intervals, R2, and sum of square
errors  are indicated, p-values too small to report.
Strategy Frequency Lag Slope (95% C.I.) R2 S.S.E.
Individual learners – 5 1.159 (1.155–1.164) 0.8312 127.8
Social  learners 10 8 2.063 (2.054–2.072) 0.7940 517.5
Social  learners 30 9 2.079 (2.070–2.089) 0.7944 537.4
Social  learners 50 9 2.135 (2.126–2.145) 0.7922 582.3
Social  learners 70 10 2.225 (2.215–2.235) 0.7905 635.29
Social  learners 90 13 2.434 (2.421–2.447) 0.7334 1076.8
Social  learners 95 16 2.487 (2.472–2.501) 0.6904 1402.4
Social  learners 99 27 2.511 (2.488–2.534) 0.4789 3214.1
Social  learners 99.8 39 2.226 (2.197–2.256) 0.3047 5636.4
Social  learners 99.9 43 2.037 (2.005–2.069) 0.2364 6513.2
Social  learners 99.99 64 1.309 (1.270–1.347) 0.0820 9326.4
here. Among the two, however, ITW is vastly more plausible in many respects (as we  also argue in the main text), which is
why we focus on this strategy.
Appendix C. Linear regression analysis
Initial examination of our ﬁndings suggested that individual learners reﬂect environmental changes in a 1:1 fashion,
whereas social learners exaggerate environmental changes. To analyze how strongly different agents react to environmental
changes, we performed a linear regression analysis of the proportion of A choices made by the agents as a function of
environmental changes in the form of pA − pB (see Fig. 11, left column). The data for individual learners and for social
learners of varying frequencies are shown in Table 3. Individual learners match the environment; they respond to a one
percentage point increase in the difference pA − pB with a 1.047% point increase in A choices. Social learners overmatch, with
overmatching intensity peaking at around 90% frequency of social learner. At this frequency, they respond to a 1% point
increase in the difference pA − pB with a 1.934% point increase in A choices. In general, linear ﬁts become weaker and weaker
the more frequent social learners become in the population, meaning that their behavior becomes more difﬁcult to predict
using a linear regression.
In general, individual learners react with only a short delay to environmental changes, whereas social learners, especially
when very frequent in the population, react with a strong delay. This could explain why  the linear model generates bad ﬁts
to the behavior of social learners, making it seem unpredictable. To correct for this, we  determined the cross-correlation of
behavior and environment for delays of different lengths (see also Section 3.3 of the main text). Then we  took the delay that
maximized cross-correlation and ﬁtted behavior to this lagged environment to achieve the best possible correlation between
behavior and environment (see Fig. 11, right column). The results are shown in Table 4. In contrast to the previous ﬁndings,
we now report overall higher slopes for the correlation between behavior and environment. Still individual learners match
environmental changes (1.159:1), whereas social learners tend to overmatch (2.135:1 for 50% frequency of social learners,
2.511:1 for 99% frequency of social learners). Obviously, R2 become better after correcting for delay but still remain quite
small for higher frequencies of social learners. Even after accounting for delay, the behavior of social learners thus remains
unpredictable.Appendix D. How well behavior reﬂects reality
We  were interested in whether the behavior of the agents in our model allows to infer the state of the environment. More
precisely, we assume that there is a threshold value x that is chosen to infer that pA > pB and thus that A should be chosen
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Fig. 11. Scatter plots of behavior (proportion of A choices) of different strategies as a function of the environmental state (pA − pB); only every 50th data
point  is shown to reduce ﬁle size.
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over B. For example, if this threshold is set at 50%, the most obvious choice, the inference would be that A is better than B if
more than half of the population choose A and vice versa.
Using this criterion, four outcomes are possible. First, one could conclude that A is better than B when indeed A is
better than B (true positive); that A is better than B when instead B is better than A (false positive); that A is worse
than B when indeed A is worse than B (true negative); and that A is worse than B when instead A is better than B
(false negative). These four outcomes, in relation to the chosen threshold, are illustrated in panel A of Fig. 12. In pan-
els B, C, and D, the proportion of true and false positives and negatives as derived from simulations are cumulatively
shown. The total proportion of true estimations is shown as the dashed line. Individual learners are shown in panel
B. They have a peak of total true estimations of 88.2% for a threshold of 0.5. Social learners at a frequency of 50% are
shown in panel C. The peak of total true estimations is close to 0.5 but lower than for individual learners, 82.9%. Social
learners at a frequency of 99.8% are shown in panel D. The proportion of true estimations is almost constant for thresh-
olds between 0.05 and 0.95 and very low, hardly exceeding 64%. This shows that it is hard to infer the environmental
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ppendix E. Pseudocode
Here is a very high level pseudocode describing how the simulations work. The pseudocode as used for the robustness
nalysis is shown. The whole code can be found online at https://github.com/BenjaminBossan/coevo. Note that to increase
omputational speed, the actual code is vectorized, which may  make it hard to read.
Draw parameters tmax, r, kincr, pincr, p, pskill, and sample size using Latin hypercube sampling
Initialize population with starting frequencies of the strategies (typically 9000 individual learners, 1000 social learners).
Each individual starts with a base ﬁtness/wealth of 10
Set ﬁrst pA and pB to 0.5 (if not stated altered by environmental parameter p)
Set very ﬁrst choice of agents to A with probability 50% and else to B
For generation 1 to 5000:
- Create a random environment pA and pB according to the parameters
- For time period 1 to tmax:
* For agent 1 to 10,000:
– Determine if last choice led to success
– Update propensities for individual learning
– Increase wealth/ﬁtness by 1 if the agent was successful
– Decide whether to choose A or B in the next period, depending on the learning strategy of the agent
* end
- end
- Generate the next generation according to evolutionary algorithm, depending on the ﬁtness of the strategies (last
generation is replaced), thus changing the frequencies of the learning strategies
- All 10,000 agents of the new generation start with an initial wealth of 10
- The ﬁrst choice of the new generation is set to the last choice made by the parent (vertical transmission)
- The ﬁrst pA and pB of the next generation is set to the last value of pA and pB from the current generation
end
For other analyses, the code is adapted accordingly. For example, for the behavioral analysis with ﬁxed strategy frequen-
ies, there is no natural selection. The exact working of the learning strategies, which is the most interesting part, is not
escribed here; for this, refer to the main text.
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